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LEGAL EFFECTS OF DELAY IN ACCEPTANCE OF INSURANCE
APPLICATIONS
The question presents itself whether an insurance company is liable in an
action for neglect or unreasonable delay in acting upon an application for
insurance where, but for such delay, the application would have been approved
and the insurance issued in time to have protected the applicant against a loss
which occurred during the period of such unreasonable delay.
There is a definite divergence of legal opinion as to the solution of this
problem which, despite numerous decisions over a period of time from the highest courts of many jurisdictions, remains today without any definite solution.
In the most recent reports three courts before which the problem was squarely
presented arrived at their results on widely different legal reasoning. This was
true notwithstanding that in two instances the court held against the insurer.,
The doctrine that an insurance company is under an affirmative legal duty
to act promptly on an application of insurance where there is nothing further
for the applicant to do and to notify the applicant of acceptance or rejection
is not of recent origin. It was first expressly laid down by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii in 1897.2 But it was not until 1912, in Boyer v. State Farmers
4
Mutual Hail Ins. Ass'n followed a year later by Duffie v. Banker's Life AsSn
1. Zayc v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940),
holding that the insurance company is not liable in negligence; Behken v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc., 293 N. IV. 200 (Sup. Ct. N. D. 1940), holding the insurance company Is
liable in negligence; American Life Ins. Co. v. Hutcheson, 109 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 6th,
1940), holding the insurer liable on theory of contract.
2. Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 11 Hawaii 69 (1897). This, a leading case,
relied upon dicta in the following cases: Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., 102
Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410 (1894); Trask v. German Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 625 (1893);
Walker v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 51 Iowa 679, 2 N. W. 583 (1873); Perkins v. Washington
Ins. Co., 4 Cow. 645 (N. Y. 1825).
3. Boyer v. State Farmer's Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912).
In this case the plaintiff on July 7th, 1909, made an application to defendant's agent for
hail insurance on a growing crop and gave a note for the premium. The agent did not
send the application or the note to the company until July 10th, and they were not
received by the company until July 12th. On July 11th, a violent hailstorm totally destroyed the crop. Had the agent promptly sent the application to the company It would
have been received and a policy would have been issued before the loss.
4. Duffle v. Banker's Life Ass'n of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913).
Joseph M. Duffie, on June 8th, 1911, made an application for life insurance to the defendant's agent who failed to send the application to the defendant's home office after
Duffle had undergone a physical examination by defendant's physician. Duffie died on
July 9th, 1911, and his widow named as beneficiary in the application brought action to
recover damages on the theory of negligence. Upon her appointment as administratrix
she filed a petition of intervention wherein she prayed for damages to the estate. A verdict
was directed for the defendant, but on appeal it was held that whether there was negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to act upon the application was a question
for the jury to determine. It further held that as the injury, if any, was to the decedent,
Mrs. Duffie, suing as administratrix and not as the proposed beneficiary, could maintain
an action for damages.
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that the doctrine gained its real impetus in the United States. Thereafter,
until the beginning of this decade, a definite trend in the law attached liability
to the insurance company. But since 1930, a number of cases indicate that
the legal tide may be turning against the liability of the insurance company
because of mere inaction.0 This recent development in favor of insurance
companies may be a result of a reconsideration of the rights and duties of
the parties and a studied analysis of the underlying legal factors involved, as
well as the social and economic forces. It is therefore timely to consider the
variant theories which are used to create or deny liability. The jurisdictions
which have allowed liability against the insurance companies have based their

decisions on widely differing legal theories. Whether this demonstrates a weakness in the reasoning of these holdings it is difficult to say in some instances,
but such disparity of logic is definitely apparent in others. The theories advanced for holding the company liable can be placed into these general groups,
ex contractu, quasi ex contractu and ex delicto.

Liability ex.contractu-Considering the liability of the insurance company
as one which arises out of contract, it has been held that continued silence by

an insurance company after submission of the application ripens into a binding
contract. The application is regarded as an offer to the insurance company in
the business of soliciting such offers and which is impliedly stating that a failure
to reject such an offer within a reasonable time may be construed as an

acceptance which binds the company in accordance with the contract terms 7
This argument is unsound and in violation of basic principles of contract law.8
5. The historical parents of the doctrine, the Boyer case, note 3, supra, and the Duffle
case, note 4, supra, had their influence felt in many jurisdictions. Among thoe allowing
recovery are included Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington,
Wisconsin, 15 A. L. R. 1026 (1918); Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa.
426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940) n. 1; see also Reck v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 116 N. J. L.
444, 184 AtL 777 (1936), holding that under the terms of the application, approval could
be assumed unless notification of rejection was made within a reasonable time.
6. Liability has been negatived in the following jurisdictions: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. Zayc
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940) n. 2.
Several jurisdictions have refused to take a definite or final position for one reason or
another. They include: Ohio [Veser v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 44 Ohio App. 29, 185
N. E. 565 (1932)]; Montana [Weaver v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 99 Mont. 296, 42
P. (2d) 729 (1935) (on the ground that no damage was shown)]; M isouri [Forck v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 66 S. W. (2d) 983 (Mo. App. 1933) (court tends toward
liability); Mathews v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S. W. (2d) 327 (Mo. App. 1939) (tends
toward liability on the basis of estoppel)]; Wyoming [Dunne v. Western Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 35 Wyo. 59, 246 Pac. 246 (1926) (where there is a failure to pay a premium no
liability attaches)].
7. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899); Robinson v. U. S.
Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N. W. 211 (1903); and very recently reaffirmed in Amer.
Life Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Hutcheson, 109 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
8. REsT.T=aSN T, Co\7 mrs (1932) § 72; 1 W Luro:u, Co=LaAcrs, 891 ff. (1936);
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If the company is dilatory in indicating its decision on the application, a clear
remedy is open to the applicant: he may insist upon prompt action, or withdraw his offer and reclaim the down payment. But the applicant cannot rely
on the supineness of the company, coupled with a failure to act on his oun
part, and erect a binding contract out of the dual failure to act.0
It has been held that there is nothing about an insurance application which
ought to take it out of ordinary, established rules of contract. In Swentusky
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,10 the court argued, despite a recognition that the
failure to act upon the policy may result in a loss to the applicant and to
potential beneficiaries, that these hardships incident to delay are not peculiar
to the insurance calling. An offer to purchase needed goods, in anticipation of
a rise in prices, may result in loss by the failure of the offeree to act upon it
within a reasonable time. Yet no liability would attach in such a situation
as a result of silence on the part of the offeree.
Of course it is well established that there may be a duty to speak under
special circumstances 1 ' but this special rule does not seem to have any application to the problem herein considered. Indeed, the special circumstances
necessary to create a duty to speak are generally negatived in the application
by express conditions set down therein. Such application usually contains the
express reservation that the company shall not be bound until the application
is approved, the policy issued, and the first premium paid. The attaching of
liability to the insurer on the theory of acceptance by silence may be explained,
in part, by the fact that the court is forced into the position of either holding
the company liable on that theory or not at all since the action was instituted
against the company on the theory of contract.
Another ingenious method of erecting a contractual liability against the
insurance company runs through the cases. It has been held that the retention
of payments made in advance beyond a reasonable time constitutes an acceptance. 12 There can be no question that, unless otherwise expressly agreed, the
payment made upon the submission of the application for a policy is to be
returned if there is no acceptance. But is the failure to return a premium an
indication of an acceptance? The argument is offered that the company in
Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YA=
L. J. 1691.
9.

Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, 61 Ala. 163 (1878).

See also Savage v. Prudential

Life Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929); Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
U. S., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D. C. Mo. 1933).
10. Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 Conn. 526, 165 A. 686 (1931).
11. Corbin, supra note 8.
12. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899); Robinson v. U. S
Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N. W. 211 (1903); Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan,
239 S. W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); In Cloyd v. Republic Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 137
Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d) 431 (1933) and Stearns v. Merchant's Life & Cas. Co., 38 N. D. 524,
165 N. W. 568 (1918) acceptance was found in express agreement that payment would be
refunded if no policy was issued. See also RESTATnEMT, CoNTRAcrS § 72 (2).
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fact has not "retained" the money as an act of acceptance of the offer but
has merely failed to return it and that the applicant might have it back on

demand at any time. 3 An attempt to spell out a mutual intent to enter into
a contract under such circumstances woud be a distortion of the legal effects
of the retention of a premium or the tardiness of the company in returning it
to the applicant.
Sometimes elements of estoppel have been resorted to in seeking to establish
a basis for liability against the insurer. 14 Professor Vancelu has stated that
in order to establish an estoppel the one making such claim must prove: (a)
that a false representation was made as to some fact material to the contract,
(b) that such representation was made with the expectation that it would be
acted upon, (c) that claimant in good faith did rely upon it, and (d) that in
so relying he acted to his prejudice. It can be seen that the elements of estoppel
are lacking in the ordinary case where an action is brought against the insurer
for his failure to act upon the application within a reasonable time. The insurer
certainly cannot be held to have made a false representation of fact. The fact
that an applicant may have been "lulled into a sense of security" from the
mere fact that he filled out an application cannot work an estoppel against
the insurer. 16
An implied in fact agreement is another legal formula which some jurisdictions have used as a means of attaching liability to the insurer.Y7 However,
a contract implied in fact, no less than an express contract, has its inception
in the intent of the parties. It necessitates a mutual meeting of the minds of
the parties coupled with an intent to promise and to be bound.18 While there
can be no quarrel with a feeling that the insurance company ought to act upon
the application promptly and forward word of acceptance or rejection to the
applicant, any attempt to work out an implied in fact contract is weak. No
such agreement is expressly made and no unexpressed intent to make such
agreement in fact could be or should be implied. Indeed it has been suggested
that, if the courts should decide that there is an implied contract, within a
13.

(1935) 3 U. oF CHL L. REv. 39, 47.

14. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899); Robinson v. U. S.
Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N. W. 211 (1903); Great Southern Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239
S. W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Mathews v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 128 S. W. (2d) 327
(Mo. App. 1939). Cf. Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 152 La. 865.
94 So. 424 (1922).
15. VAxcir, Ihsu-mxcE (2d ed. 1930) § 138, p. 514 ff.

16. More v. N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 537, 29 N. E. 757 (1S92); Winchell
v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 130 Iowa 189, 72 N. NV. 503; Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454; Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S. W. (2d)
1027 (1934). See also note 19.
17. Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185 N. C. 121, 116 S.E. 266 (1923); De Ford
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Columbian Nat. Life Ins.
Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okda. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); Kukuska v. Home Mutual HailTornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W. 403 (1931).
18. 1 Wniisrom-, CoNTRA CTs (1936) § 83.
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short time all insurance companies would incorporate in their application blanks
stipulations expressly negativing such agreement. 19
Liability quasi ex contractu-At least one court seeks to hold the insurance
company upon a theory of quasi contract.20 If unjust enrichment of the insurance company could be shown this argument may be tenable. Some theory
of quasi contract must be invoked which will create liability for the face value
of the policy. But the fact that a conditional deposit was paid does not spell
out a case of unjust enrichment, at least in excess of amount of premium paid
and unjustly retained. The plaintiff is always entitled to demand his money
back, no other special circumstances appearing. From the foregoing, it can be
seen that the courts have encountered considerable difficulty in attempting
to hold the insurer liable on any theory of contract whether express, implied
in fact or implied in law.
Liability ex delicto-The Duffle case 21 formulated a tort liability against the
insurance carriers based on the duty of reasonable care. This theory was seized
upon by several courts but again weaknesses in its formulation may be noted.
While it is not difficult to prove dilatory methods of the insurance company
in acting upon the policy, courts are unable satisfactorily to create a legal
duty arising out of such delay. The Duffle case first suggested that an insurance
company doing business under a franchise has assumed a duty toward the
public, and several jurisdictions have followed this line of reasoning.2 - But
does the franchise per se establish any such duty? If so it applies to other
corporations as well, operating under a franchise. It must be something more
than the franchise that creates the special duty to act and to act promptly.
The franchise to engage in the insurance calling should impose no more duty
to act without delay upon an application for insurance than would be required
of a bank receiving an application for a loan. a
A closely related argument is that such companies are under a duty to act
promptly since the insurance business is one that is greatly affected with the
public interest. 24 It is undisputed that the public interest is great in such cases.
75 U. PA. L. REV. 204, 224.

19.

(1927)

20.

Kukuska v. Home Mutual Hail-Tornado Ins., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W. 403 (1931).

21.

Duffle v. Banker's Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913).

22. De Ford v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924). Wilken v.
Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021 (1916); Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923).
23. (1935) 3 U. or CHI. L. REV. 39, 51.

Swentusky v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of

America, 116 Conn. 526, 165 At. 686 (1933); Miller v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Ill.
App. 586 (1930); Amer. Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors, 124 Tex. 221, 76 S. W. (2d) 497 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1934).

24.

Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N. W. 435 (1933), Do Ford

v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins.
Co., 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021 (1916); Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185
N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 266 (1923); Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151
(1922); Columbian Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1924); Dyer
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925).
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But no more so than in others.- True, the duty of the insurance company
to act may be the subject of legislation and is seemingly within the police
powers of the State 26 But this provides no basis for the exercise of the legislative function by the court and such judicial legislation has evoked criticism.The same idea of imposed responsibility, due to the nature of the insurance
Herein it is stated arbitrarily
business, is found in the leading Boyer case
that there is a duty on the insurance agent to forward the application to the
company. The court reasoned that there is sufficient damage to be apprehended
from delay in passing on the application and that a reasonably prudent businessman would have acted with diligence. The court without setting forth any
reasons, argues that if the agent alone be considered it is clear enough that
he would be liable if his negligent retention of the application prevented its
timely acceptance. Since the agent is merely the arm of the defendant,--so
runs the argument-the obligation to accept or reject is ultimately the obligation
of the defendant. Thus, it concluded that the duty of the defendant to secure
prompt transmission of the application from the solicitor's field to the central
office is quite apparent. It is to be regretted that the court treated the problem
with such brevity and without explaining the reasons that prompted him to
reach the result.29
Zayc v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CoY0 and Behken v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society 3 raise the problem of the proper party to bring the
action. This is limited only to cases involving life insurance, for if any duty
in other insurance relations is owing, it is to the applicant. The aforementioned
cases prefer to give the beneficiary the right to bring the action. But the
majority of jurisdictions3 2 have held that the decedent's estate is the proper
25. It has been held that there is no apparent reason why an insurance contract should
be regarded as of any more interest to the public than a contract of employment. It i3
of as much importance to the public that a person and his dependents have support during
his lifetime, by wages or salary as that his beneficiaries have a competency, through insurance after his death. It has never been held that delay in passing upon an application
for employment affected the public interest to the extent that it made employers liable
for all damages arising from such delay. Thornton v. Nat. Council Junior Order United
American Mechanics, 110 W. Va. 412, 158 S. E. 507 (1931). See also Swentu~lty v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 At. 686 (1933); Amer. Life Ins. Co. v.
Nabors, 124 Tex. 221, 76 S. W. (2d) 497 (1934); Schliep v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.,
191 Minn. 479, 254 N. W. 618 (1934).
26. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 (1922); German Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
27. Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
28. Boyer v. State Farmer's Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912).
29. (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. Rrv. 207, 224.
30. 338 Pa. 426, 13 A. (2d) 34 (1940).

31. 293 N. W. 200 (Sup. Ct. N. D. 1940).
32. Royal Neighbors of America v. Forlenberry, 214 Ala. 787, 107 So. 846 (1926);
Veser v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 Ohio App. 293, 185 N. E. 565 (1931); Stray v.
Western States Life Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 329, 300 Pac. 1046 (1931); Forct v. Prudential
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party to bring the action since no relationship exists between the insurer and
the beneficiary. It would seem that the decedent's estate could claim as damages
only the amount of the premium that has been paid. 8 It is submitted that
the beneficiary named in the application is the proper party to bring the action,
for then the amount of the policy is the measure of damages, and the unjust4
result which follows an action by the decedent's estate is done away with.
Despite the technical difficulties of formulating legal theories which render
the insurance company liable, it is submitted that the rules holding the insurance
companies liable for their delay are economically desirable. Courts are aware
that insurance plays an extensive paxt in our complex civilization and that the
business is quasi-public in character. The tendency is to shift, wherever possible,
the burden of loss due to accident or catastrophe from the individual to the
community, or a group within the community. In some instances this policy
has been carried into effect -by legislation, as in Workmen's Compensation
Laws, but the courts have also been ready to further it in their treatment of the
35
rules of common law.
The soundest solution would appear to be the enactment of proper legislation
stating precisely duties of insurance companies in the matter of insurance
applications. If the insurer is to be held liable, the statute should specifically
state at what point and under what circumstances such liability is to arise.
North Dakota has adopted a statute88 which was definitely upheld as constitutional in the United States Supreme Court. 7 The suggested statute should
grant the right of action to the named beneficiary, if one appears, since this
would be in accordance with the decedent's express wishes and would prevent
creditors of the decedent from satisfying their claims out of this fund, thereby
following the rule in all cases where the policy is actually issued.
Ins. Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 983 (Mo. App. 1933). See also Duffle v. Banker's Life Ass'n,
160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913); De Ford v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224
Pac. 249 (1924); Miller v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Ill. App. 586 (1930).

33. Thornton v. Nat. Council Junior Order United Amer. Mechanics, 110 NV. Va. 412,
158 S. E. 507 (1931).
34. (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 207, 225.

35. ibid.
36.

N. D. Coan'. LAws ANx. (1913)

§ 4902.

37. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. WVanberg, 260 U. S. 71 (1932). See also German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914), settles right of a state legislature to
regulate conduct by insurance corporation as a business affected with public interest.

